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INTRODUCTION
In National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,1 the
Supreme Court exhaustively analyzed Congress’s constitutional power to
enact the watershed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or
“Obamacare”).2 The ACA requires health insurance companies to issue
* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Yale, 1988.
** William H. Rehnquist Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law; Professor Emeritus,
UCLA School of Law and University of Missouri School of Law.
This article grew out of several presentations we made at Pepperdine in 2011–12, and we are
grateful to the Pepperdine Law Review editors for offering to publish it and for their editorial
assistance.
1. 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
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policies to all applicants, without adjusting the price to reflect individualized
consideration of risk factors such as pre-existing medical conditions.3
Standing alone, this requirement would discourage younger and healthier
people from purchasing such insurance unless or until they became seriously
ill or injured, at which point insurers would have to cover them–a result that
would effectively shift billions in costs to those who had maintained
insurance all along.4 To solve this problem, Obamacare imposes a “shared
responsibility requirement,” popularly known as the “Individual Mandate”
(IM), which forces Americans to buy medical insurance or pay a “penalty.”5
The ACA’s text and legislative history, as well as the public defenses of
it by President Obama and his supporters, consistently described the IM not
as a “tax” but rather as a valid exercise of Congress’s power “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”6 This reliance on the Commerce
Clause was understandable, as it has been interpreted since 1937 as giving
Congress virtually plenary authority.7 Indeed, the modern Court has upheld
every federal statute (with two trivial exceptions) after applying an
extremely deferential standard of review: Could Congress have had a
rational basis for concluding that the activity regulated, taken in the
aggregate nationwide, “substantially affects” interstate commerce?8 This
judicially-approved legislation addressed not merely national economic
matters (such as industrial and labor relations, agricultural commodities, and
banking), but also seemingly non-commercial subjects like civil rights,
crime, the environment, and health and safety.9
In National Federation, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan sought to continue this lenient approach by ruling that Congress
could reasonably have determined that Americans’ decisions about health
insurance (including the failure to obtain it), when added up nationally,
3. See ACA, 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B and 300gg (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207). In technical
terms, the ACA requires “guaranteed issue” of insurance coverage and “community rating” to
prohibit pricing based on individual characteristics. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.Ct. at 2585 (Roberts, C.J.)
(citing statute).
4. See ACA, 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207) (congressional
findings).
5. See ACA, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207). Obamacare is a
lengthy statute, and we have highlighted only those provisions that are directly relevant to
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
6. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.Ct. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(discussing how Congress enacted the ACA under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3); see also id. at 2650–55 (explaining why the IM could not sensibly be treated as a “tax”).
7. See infra Part I.
8. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 13–27 (2005) (examining the pertinent cases). The
Court created the “substantial effects” test in 1937, added the “aggregation” principle five years
later, and announced the “rational basis” standard in 1964. See infra notes 39–45 and accompanying
text.
9. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause CounterRevolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 889–909 (2005) [hereinafter Pushaw, Medical
Marijuana Case] (summarizing and analyzing this precedent).
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substantially affect the interstate economy.10 However, Chief Justice
Roberts and his four conservative Republican colleagues held that the IM
had exceeded the bounds of the Commerce Clause, which restricted
Congress to regulating interstate commercial “activity”–as contrasted with
the IM’s novel attempt to compel Americans who were inactive in a market
to buy something they did not want.11 Moreover, the majority would not
allow Congress to avoid this result by invoking the Necessary and Proper
Clause, since the IM was not a “proper” means of effectuating the
Commerce Clause because it undermined the Constitution’s very structure,
especially the fundamental principle of limited and enumerated federal
powers.12
The Chief Justice then unexpectedly joined the four liberal Democrats in
holding that the IM could plausibly be construed as a “tax” on those who did
not buy medical insurance and therefore could be sustained under
Congress’s power to “Lay and Collect Taxes.”13 Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito assailed this interpretation because Congress had
expressly disavowed that the IM was a “tax,” and instead had characterized
this mandate as a “penalty” for violating its Commerce Clause regulation
requiring the purchase of insurance.14
These four dissenters barely concealed their anger at Chief Justice
Roberts for switching sides (apparently at the eleventh hour due to intense
political pressure) to save Obamacare on dubious Taxing Power grounds.15

10. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.Ct. at 2609–28 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in
part).
11. See id. at 2585–93 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
12. See id. at 2592–93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
13. See id. at 2593–2600 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). The Court also invalidated an ACA provision that ordered states to either
provide health care to their poor citizens or lose all their federal Medicaid funds, because Congress
lacked power under the Spending Clause to coerce states to obey federally imposed conditions. See
id. at 2601–08 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); accord id. at 2656–67 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). I will not dwell on the taxing or spending issues, but
instead will concentrate on the Commerce Clause.
14. See id. at 2650–55 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing the ACA’s
text and legislative history).
15. A respected legal journalist reported, based on confidential sources inside the Court, that
Roberts had intended to invalidate the ACA for two months after the March oral arguments but had
had a change of heart in May–much to the dismay of his conservative brethren. See Jan Crawford,
Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBSNEWS.COM (July 1, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-carelaw/. The four other Republican Justices did not explicitly mention this flip-flop, but instead subtly
signaled that it had occurred by issuing a very unusual opinion.
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Most Republican legal analysts had a similar reaction.16 A few such
commentators, however, adopted the positive spin that Roberts had cleverly
handed liberal Democrats a short-term victory, but promoted conservative
Republican goals in the long run by significantly curtailing Congress’s
power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.17
Interestingly, the four liberal Justices and their scholarly defenders echoed
that worry.18 They fretted that the Court had radically altered its Commerce

For example, they began with an unprecedented caption: “Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, dissenting.” Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.Ct. at 2642. Traditionally,
however, only one Justice signs a dissent, which is then joined by the others. More tellingly, these
four Justices styled their opinion as a “dissent,” despite the fact that they actually concurred with the
Chief Justice on every issue except the Taxing Clause–and therefore largely repeated his arguments
on the Commerce and Spending Clauses. Indeed, the dissent is written as though it were a majority
opinion. See John C. Eastman, Hidden Gems in the Historical 2011-2012 Term, and Beyond, 7
CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2012) (citing numerous examples of phrasing that are indicative of a
majority opinion); see also id. at 18–19 (quoting several statements by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito that are harshly critical of the majority, which appear to have been tacked on to
their original draft “as though to highlight the dissenters’ pique at what had transpired”). Another
clue about Roberts’s shift is that the other four Republican Justices repeatedly referred to Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence as a “dissent”–and that her opinion does read like a dissent. Id. at 19.
Overall, the evidence indicates that Roberts initially embraced his fellow conservatives’ entire
opinion, and that they refused to materially change it after he defected. See David Bernstein, More
Hints That Roberts Switched his Vote, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2012),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/28/.
16. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 15, at 16–22 (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts
succumbed to partisan attacks by President Obama and his acolytes by switching his vote and
sustaining the ACA on the basis of an “uncharacteristically weak” and “contrived” opinion on
Congress’s power to tax).
Of particular interest is the response of Randy Barnett. Beginning shortly after the
introduction of Obamacare, he published numerous short pieces challenging the constitutionality of
Congress’s attempt to regulate inactivity through a mandate, which were later summarized in Randy
E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Commandeering].
Professor Barnett also served as the attorney who spearheaded the litigation aimed at invalidating the
ACA. After National Federation came down, he lamented that Chief Justice Roberts had
apparently changed his vote because of political pressure and institutional considerations (preserving
the Court’s perceived commitment to “judicial restraint” by deferring to the democratic process) and
had upheld the IM through a strained reading of the ACA and the Taxing Clause. See Randy E.
Barnett, The Wages of Crying “Restraint,” AMERICAN SPECTATOR 6–7 (Sept. 28, 2012),
http://spectator.org/people/randy-e-barnett/article.xml. [hereinafter Barnett, Wages]. Nonetheless,
he praised the Court for reaffirming the basic constitutional precept of limited and enumerated
federal powers by rebuffing Congress’s assertion of authority to enact the IM under the Commerce,
Necessary and Proper, and Spending Clauses. See id. at 6–7.
17. See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 87 n.20 (2012)
(noting that conservatives such as Randy Barnett, Jonathan Adler, and Ilya Shapiro had taken this
position). George F. Will, Conservatives’ Consolation Prize, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-supreme-court-gives-conservatives-aconsolation-prize/2012/06/28 (maintaining that Roberts’s rejection of the Commerce Clause
rationale for the IM will be a long-haul victory for conservatives); Charles Krauthammer, Why
Roberts Did It, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/2012-0628/opinions/35462722/obamacare-health-insurance-national-health-care (arguing that Roberts’
opinion promoted his overall conservative ideology while maintaining the Court’s neutrality).
18. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2609, 2615–19 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and
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Clause jurisprudence by refusing to defer to Congress’s policy judgments
about an important national economic and social issue, which would invite
similar challenges.19
It is impossible to say with any certitude whether such concerns are
warranted. Liberals are understandably alarmed by the holding that the
ACA did not fall within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce–
the first major federal statute to meet that fate since 1936.20 It may be that
National Federation portends a shift to increasingly aggressive judicial
imposition of serious Commerce Clause restraints. On balance, however,
history and pragmatism suggest that this case will have a marginal
jurisprudential impact.
This conclusion rests primarily on the fact that, since the New Deal era,
the Court has sustained all major Commerce Clause legislation, which forms
the foundation of the modern administrative and social welfare state.21
Realistically, the Court would risk legal, political, social, and economic
chaos by rolling back its precedent allowing such important federal laws.22
Thus, at most the conservative Justices can try to stem the tide of new
Commerce Clause statutes.23 Yet recent experience suggests that even that
modest goal will prove difficult to achieve, as the Rehnquist Court’s lone
attempt to enforce an outer boundary on Congress’s power–that it could
regulate only subjects that were “commercial” in nature–fizzled out within a
decade.24
Likewise, National Federation’s new “activity” limit will probably have
little lasting relevance, for three reasons. First, the ACA represented
dissenting in part); see also Metzger, supra note 17, at 87 n.21 (citing liberal law professors like
Pamela Karlan and Andrew Koppelman, who expressed the fear that their side may have won the
case but lost the larger fight to prevent the court from hobbling Congress’s ability to enact
progressive legislation); Laurence Tribe, Chief Justice John Roberts’s Ruling Restores Faith in the
Court’s Neutrality, http://www.dailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/28chief-justice-john-roberts-rulingrestores-faith 3-6 (applauding Roberts for sustaining the IM as a valid tax and thereby helping to
bring back public trust in the Court’s impartiality, but cautioning that the Court’s “wrong”
interpretation of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses might have a long-term
deleterious effect, depending on which Justices are on the bench).
19. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.Ct. at 2609, 2615–19 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting
in part).
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 697–99, 714–19 (2002).
23. See Barnett, Wages, supra note 16, at 3–7 (contending that the Court’s “New Federalism”
involves accepting the New Deal and Warren Court decisions, but requiring Congress to justify its
exercise of novel powers by explaining how they can be reconciled with the constitutional tenet of
limited and enumerated powers).
24. See infra notes 47–63 and accompanying text.
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Congress’s only attempt in over two centuries to use the Commerce Clause
to regulate “inactivity,”25 and there do not appear to be any similar federal
statutes in existence or on the horizon. Second, even if Congress were to
enact such a law, it would be invalidated only if five conservative
Republican Justices happened to be on the Court. If one such Justice were
replaced by a Democrat (a certainty if such a vacancy occurs in the next
three years), the new appointee would almost surely join the four other
liberals to reverse National Federation. No Democratic Justice in eight
decades has voted to constrain the Commerce Power, and four liberal
Justices have bitterly dissented from the Court’s recent attempts to do so
through the “commercial” and “activity” touchstones.26 Third, the latter
restriction on the Commerce Clause did not put a dent in Congress’s overall
power, because Chief Justice Roberts peeled off to uphold the ACA through
his creative interpretation of the Taxing Power. The Court will likely remain
unwilling to strike down non-trivial federal statutes.
The aforementioned points will be developed in four Parts. Part I
provides an overview of Commerce Clause precedent. Part II summarizes
National Federation. Part III identifies the key problems with this decision
and argues that its real-world effect will likely be minimal. Part IV proposes
a different approach to the Commerce Clause that is rooted in its text,
history, and underlying political theory. Those legal materials reveal that
Congress can regulate only the voluntary sale of goods or services and all
accompanying activities geared toward the market, and accordingly cannot
mandate the purchase of insurance or anything else.
I. THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The IM marks the first time Congress exercised its power “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States”27 to reach inactivity—not having
health insurance—by forcing individuals to purchase this product.28 A bare
majority held that Congress lacked such power,29 whereas the dissenters
reached the opposite conclusion on the rationale that the failure of millions
of Americans to purchase medical insurance “substantially affected”
These divergent opinions reflect differing
interstate commerce.30

25. The majority stressed this novelty. See id. at 2586–87 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2644-46
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
26. See infra notes 49, 77–87 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
29. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.);
accord id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). The Court adopted the
argument that had been developed by Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 587–607, 614–37.
30. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2609–25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
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understandings of the Court’s precedent. It is therefore helpful to begin by
summarizing these cases, which can usefully be grouped into three periods:
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the New Deal era and
subsequent six decades of total deference; and the Rehnquist Court’s aborted
attempt to craft limitations.
A. Early Precedent
During America’s first century, Congress exercised its power to regulate
interstate commerce cautiously, and hence litigation was rare. In fact, there
was only one landmark case: Gibbons v. Ogden.31 Ogden claimed that his
monopoly on his New York-to-New Jersey ferry route, conferred by the
New York Legislature, had been infringed when Gibbons began to operate
his ferry under a license granted pursuant to a 1793 federal statute regulating
“vessels to be employed in the coasting trade.”32 In an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, the Court rejected Ogden’s argument that Congress had
exceeded its power because “commerce” exclusively concerned “traffic”
(buying, selling, or exchanging commodities) and thus did not include
navigation: “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more . .
. . It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying
on that intercourse.”33 Marshall also defined “among the several States” as
including only commerce which concerns more than one state, as contrasted
with wholly internal state commerce.34
The Court did not revisit Gibbons until the late nineteenth century, when
Congress enacted legislation to deal with pressing economic issues such as
railroads and monopolies.35 The Court sought to restrict Congress, mainly
by defining “commerce” to include only trade and transportation—not
productive activities such as manufacturing and labor.36
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
32. Id. at 2.
33. See id. at 189–90; see also id. at 193 (The Commerce Clause has “been universally admitted
[to] . . . comprehend every species of commercial intercourse,” including navigation.). Although
Marshall properly confined his opinion to the disputed issue of shipping, Justice Johnson declared
that the broad intended scope of “commerce” included activities such as paid labor and other
services, “mediums of exchange” like commercial paper, communications, and related operations.
See id. at 229–30 (Johnson, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 195, 203.
35. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying
First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social
Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 67–79 (1999) (citing legislation and cases).
36. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272–76 (1918) (holding that Congress could
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B. The New Deal Revolution and its Aftermath
A majority of Justices persisted with this narrow construction in striking
down New Deal laws, championed by President Franklin Roosevelt, dealing
with problems such as agricultural overproduction, labor strife, and
industrial woes.37 In 1936, however, voters decisively reelected Roosevelt
and a clear majority of his Democratic allies in Congress.38
The Court read the tea leaves and reversed course. In 1937, it upheld
the National Labor Relations Act on the ground that Congress, pursuant to
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, could regulate any
activity—even noncommercial or intrastate—that “substantially affected”
interstate commerce.39 More importantly, in Wickard v. Filburn,40 the Court
allowed the Agricultural Adjustment Act to be applied to a small farmer who
had grown wheat in excess of his federally-imposed quota and had used it
for home consumption,41 even though the farmer (1) had not been engaged in
“commerce” (raising wheat for sale), and (2) had acted within one state
(indeed, only on his farm).42 Furthermore, the Court did not care about the
farmer’s “trivial” impact on interstate commerce, because Congress could
determine the “substantial effect” by aggregating all of the regulated activity
(here, home-grown wheat) nationwide.43
As the Justices knew, virtually all statutes would meet this toothless
“substantial effects”/”aggregate” test, and they did.44 Remarkably, the Court
weakened that test even further in sustaining the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
asserting that Congress did not have to demonstrate the “substantial effect”
on interstate commerce; rather, it was sufficient that some “rational basis”
not ban child labor); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 2–9 (1895) (ruling that Congress
lacked power under the Commerce Clause to extend antitrust laws to a national corporation’s
purchase of sugar refineries that gave it control of 98% of the sugar market, because manufacturing
was not “commerce”).
37. See Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 297–310 (1936) (citing cases endorsing this
cramped understanding of commerce to justify invalidating a federal statute regulating production
and labor in the coal industry); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act, which sought to control many industries and
trades—even small and local outfits—by establishing “fair competition” codes and regulating
employees’ wages and hours).
38. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 50–57, 61–66, 101–22, 129–30
(1991) (describing the profound effect of this election on the Court).
39. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34–40 (1937). The Court
concluded that Congress could reach even non-commercial or local activities if doing so was
“necessary and proper” to carry into effect its regulations of interstate commerce. See id. at 36–37;
see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113–19 (1941) (approving the Fair Labor Standards
Act on a similar rationale).
40. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
41. Id. at 113–28.
42. Id. at 120–25.
43. Id. at 127–28.
44. Indeed, the Court upheld every federal law enacted under the Commerce Clause from 1937
until 1994. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 35, at 79–88 (citing cases).
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could be conceived for it.45 Not surprisingly, for three decades the Court
rubber-stamped every challenged federal statute, such as novel criminal and
environmental laws.46
C. The Rehnquist Court’s Rediscovery of Commerce Clause Limits
This judicial abdication ended with United States v. Lopez,47 when Chief
Justice Rehnquist and four other conservatives invalidated the Gun-Free
School Zones Act (GFSZA), which criminalized possession of a firearm
near a school.48 Creatively reinterpreting its precedent,49 the Court
announced that when Congress regulated an area of “traditional state
concern” (like crime or education), the “rational basis”/“substantial effects”
test could be applied to strike down statutes like the GFSZA that did not
regulate activity that was “commercial,” either of itself or as “an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”50
Lopez generated confusion.
Most troubling was Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s failure to explain which federal statutes interfering with
“traditional state concerns” would warrant heightened scrutiny or why the
Court had permitted Congress to enact thousands of criminal and
educational laws.51 Compounding this problem, the Chief Justice expressly
refused to define “commerce” (e.g., as limited to trading and transporting
goods, as Justice Thomas suggested52), and instead left the meaning of this

45. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–58 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298–305 (1964).
46. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 321–29 (1981) (sustaining a statutory provision
regulating a mining technique that threatened a minuscule amount of farmland); Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 147–58 (1971) (affirming the conviction of a small-time loan shark who
operated exclusively within New York on the ground that Congress could rationally have determined
that all loan sharking, added up nationwide, substantially affected interstate commerce).
47. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
48. Id. at 556–68.
49. Lopez was in tension with longstanding doctrine, as Congress could reasonably have found
that the possession and use of guns near schools, considered cumulatively across America,
substantially affected interstate commerce (e.g., by adversely affecting education, which decreased
students’ economic opportunities). See id. at 602–03 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603–15 (Souter,
J., dissenting); id. at 615–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). (Note that Justice Ginsburg joined each of
these dissents.). In fact, the Court had specifically upheld Congress’s power to prohibit the
possession of firearms (e.g., by felons). Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 569–77 (1977).
The majority unpersuasively purported to distinguish, rather than reverse, such case law.
50. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
51. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to Prohibit
Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 331–32 (2005).
52. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584–602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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word to be worked out on a case-by-case basis.53 Finally, Lopez did not set
forth any neutral criteria (e.g., dollar thresholds) for distinguishing
“substantial” effects on interstate commerce from “insubstantial” ones.54
The majority’s vague standards invited more litigation.
A few years later, in United States v. Morrison,55 the same majority
invalidated a provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
which created a federal tort cause of action for victims of gender-motivated
assaults.56 The Court concluded that Congress had invaded an area of
“traditional state concern” (criminal and tort law) and had no rational basis
for determining that gender-based violence was “commerce” (either
inherently or as part of a larger economic regulatory scheme) or
“substantially affected” interstate commerce.57
Lopez and Morrison were modest rulings that struck down two novel,
largely symbolic statutes that duplicated existing state legislation.58 But
when the opportunity arose to topple a longstanding and critical federal
statute, one dealing with drugs, Justices Scalia and Kennedy blinked. In
Gonzales v. Raich,59 they joined with the four Lopez/Morrison dissenters in
ruling that Congress could have rationally found that it must prohibit even
non-commercial, intrastate conduct—the growth, possession, and use of
marijuana for medical purposes as authorized by state law—because doing
so was essential to effectuating its larger regulation of interstate economic
activity (the multibillion dollar marijuana trade).60 Critics charged Justices
Scalia and Kennedy with abandoning their legal commitment to federalism
to achieve the Republican policy goal of fighting the War on Drugs without
carving any exceptions.61
The Raich Court did not overrule Lopez or Morrison, but appeared to
confine those cases to federal statutes that (1) have been recently enacted
and thus never challenged (as contrasted with laws that had been previously
sustained, such as those concerning drugs, civil rights, and the environment),
and (2) attempted to reach activity that cannot plausibly be characterized as
“commercial,” either by itself or as part of a larger economic regulatory
scheme.62 Because such federal legislation is extremely rare, most scholars
53. Pushaw, supra note 51, at 331.
54. See id.
55. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
56. Id. at 601–19.
57. Id. at 617–18.
58. See Pushaw, Medical Marijuana Case, supra note 9, at 882, 892–97.
59. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
60. See id. at 5–33. But see id. at 42–57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)
(arguing that Congress had infringed upon subjects of traditional state concern—criminal law and
medical care—and that the defendants had not engaged in any “commercial” activity because they
had used the marijuana for personal medical purposes, not for sale).
61. See Randy E. Barnett, Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743 (2005).
62. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 15–32.
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predicted that the Court would revert back to its preferred approach to the
Commerce Clause: supine deference to Congress.63 The conservative
Justices, however, imposed new limits in the Obamacare case.
II. THE NATIONAL FEDERATION DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts and his four fellow Republicans held that the IM
had exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses.64 They set forth a four-step analysis.
First, Congress had never before invoked the Commerce Clause “to
compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted
product.”65 That novel assertion of power conflicted with the meaning of the
phrase “to regulate Commerce,” which assumes the existence of commercial
activity to be regulated—as contrasted with directing the creation of such
commerce.66
Second, and relatedly, the Court had always interpreted the Commerce
Clause as reaching only commercial “activity,” not inactivity.67 Approving

63. See Pushaw, Medical Marijuana Case, supra note 9, at 883–84, 907–08 (summarizing, but
rejecting, this prevailing opinion).
64. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.);
accord id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
65. See id. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2644–46 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
JJ., dissenting). Although Congress had sometimes required certain conduct (e.g., jury duty, draft
registration, filing taxes, and buying a firearm for militia service), none of those mandates were
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2586 n.3 (Roberts, C.J.). Moreover, all of those
directives concerned basic duties that citizens owe their government. See Barnett, Commandeering,
supra note 16, at 630–32. But see Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the “Individual Mandate”:
Rounding Out the Government’s Case for Constitutionality, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55, 64–
65 (2012) (asserting that Congress had the same power to impose mandates as a means to implement
its power under the Commerce Clause as it did under all other Article I provisions, including those
dealing with military affairs).
66. The phrase “to regulate” means “to adjust by rule,” which contemplates preexisting conduct
that must be adjusted. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). The majority noted that, if the power to “regulate”
included the ability to “create,” many constitutional provisions would be redundant. See id. at 2587
(Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). For instance, the
Constitution grants Congress power to create an army and navy, then confers a separate power to
regulate such armed forces. Id. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing the pertinent constitutional clauses
and providing other examples, such as Congress’s distinct powers to coin money and to regulate its
value).
67. See id. at 2587–91 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing Raich, 545 U.S. 1; United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)); id. at 2643, 2646, 2648–50
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the ACA’s innovative attempt to address the failure to act through the IM
would enable Congress to order Americans to buy any other products (for
instance, vegetables to improve health or new automobiles to boost that
industry) and assert that its own requirement “substantially affects” interstate
commerce.68 Filburn did not go that far, as it concerned regulating farmers
who performed the commercial activity of growing wheat and whose
conduct (including raising excess wheat) substantially affected interstate
commerce—not forcing farmers to grow wheat or consumers to buy it.69
Therefore, even though inactivity (considered in the aggregate) may greatly
affect the interstate economy, permitting Congress to control it would
destroy our Constitution of limited and enumerated powers and
“fundamentally chang[e] the relation between the citizen and the Federal
Government.”70
Third, the inactivity of the uninsured could not plausibly be
recharacterized as the “activity” of self-insuring (or relying on others) to pay
for medical care when the need later arose.71 Congress could regulate only
people who were currently involved in commercial health care activity,
rather than a class of individuals (like the uninsured) who remained passive
but might participate in such activity at an uncertain future date:72
The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an
individual from cradle to grave, simply because he will predictably
engage in particular transactions. Any police power to regulate
individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, remains vested in
the States.73

(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). This argument was originally developed by
Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 587–607.
68. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2587–88 (Roberts, C.J.) (warning that allowing Congress to
address inaction—the countless decisions individuals could potentially make, all of which might
affect interstate commerce—by mandating particular conduct would open the door to virtually
untrammeled federal authority); see also id. at 2649–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (to similar effect). “If all activity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is
everything.” Id. at 2649.
69. See id. at 2587–88 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–29); see also id. at 2643,
2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (likewise distinguishing Wickard).
70. See id. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2645–49 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito,
JJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice declared: “The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate
commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have
reflected this understanding.” Id. at 2588.
71. See id. at 2589–90 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2647–49 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
72. See id. at 2590–91 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing precedent establishing that Congress could address
only classes of existing commercial activities, such as loan sharking and marijuana trafficking, not
classes of individuals whose defining feature was their inactivity); see also id. at 2647–48 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (stressing that the IM targets those people who are not
participants in the health care market).
73. See id. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.). Similarly unavailing was the Government’s claim that the
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Fourth, the Necessary and Proper Clause enabled Congress to enact laws
“derivative of” and “incidental to” an enumerated power (such as the
Commerce Clause)—not to assert new and independent substantive powers
(here, targeting individuals not involved in commercial activity).74 Put
differently, the IM was not a “proper” means of effectuating the Commerce
Clause because it undermined the Constitution’s very structure, especially
limited and enumerated powers.75 Finally, Congress had other ways to
achieve its goals, whereas in Raich the ban on possessing and consuming
marijuana was the only practical means to implement the overall scheme
regulating interstate commerce in that drug.76
Overall, the Court rejected the notion that the Commerce Clause
authorized the regulation of inactivity by mandating the purchase of a
product. Moreover, Congress could not circumvent this limitation by
invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause.
B. The Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
accused the majority of abandoning post-1937 case law, which counseled the
Court to defer to Congress’s judgments about national economic and social
welfare.77 In Justice Ginsburg’s view, this precedent dictated a holding that
Congress could have had a rational basis for determining that the ACA
(including the IM) regulates economic matters that, taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce.78 This conclusion depended upon
Court should ignore these basic principles because health insurance was unique and integrally
related to medical care consumption and financing. See id. Insurance and health care services are
different products involving separate transactions made at distinct times with different companies.
See id.; see also Barnett, Commandeering, supra note 16, at 619–20 (rejecting the Government’s
“market uniqueness” claim on the ground that it would not limit Congress, which would have
discretion to mandate the purchase of nearly any product or service that it deemed helpful to the
economy).
74. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2591–93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
75. See id. at 2592–93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting). The Court cribbed the specific argument set forth by Barnett, Commandeering, supra
note 16, at 595–601, 604–07, 618–37. The general thesis about the limitations inherent in the word
“proper” was originally developed in Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993)
(contending that the Necessary and Proper Clause prohibited federal laws that were not “proper”
because they expanded federal power, invaded state prerogatives, or infringed individual liberty).
76. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2591–93 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
77. See id. at 2609, 2615–17, 2619 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
78. See id. at 2609–28.
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portraying the IM as concerning not insurance, but rather broader decisions
about how to pay for health care services and goods—a market in which
everyone will participate at some point.79 Justice Ginsburg noted that
average Americans cannot afford to purchase non-routine medical care from
their assets, and that therefore most people obtain insurance.80 She
emphasized, however, that millions of uninsured people simply consume
health care services (often by going to emergency rooms where they cannot
legally be turned away) and never pay, which shifts billions in costs to the
insured (who get stuck with higher premiums) or taxpayers.81 Justice
Ginsburg found that the uninsured thereby exerted a substantial, multibillion
dollar effect on interstate commerce which justified congressional
intervention.82
Moreover, she contended that the Commerce Clause’s text and
precedent nowhere distinguished “activity” from “inactivity.”83 On the
contrary, the Court in Wickard recognized that Congress could regulate
interstate commerce in wheat by “‘forcing some farmers into the market to
buy what they could provide for themselves.’”84 Similarly, cases like
Wickard and Raich permitted federal regulation of current conduct (even
non-commercial) because of its predicted future impact on interstate
commerce.85
Alternatively, Justice Ginsburg argued that, even if the IM itself were
deemed to reach non-commercial and local matters, under the Necessary and
Proper Clause Congress could reasonably have concluded that the mandate
was “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which

79. See id. at 2610–11, 2620; see also id. at 2617, 2634 (claiming that foregoing insurance is an
“economic” decision).
80. See id. at 2610.
81. See id. at 2610–11, 2619–20, 2623 (making this point, and noting that this “free ride” was
not true of any other market, so that the IM was not a precedent to impose mandates in other
industries such as autos or food); see also id. at 2611–12 (stressing that the uninsured also skip
preventative care, which later massively increases costs); see also Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act § 10106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F), (G) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207)
(congressional findings that the provision of uncompensated medical care to the uninsured costs $43
billion annually and that these costs were shifted to the insured through higher premiums or to
taxpayers).
82. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2612–15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in
part); see also id. at 2612 (asserting that states acting individually cannot solve this problem, because
providing the uninsured with health care coverage puts them at a competitive disadvantage).
83. See id. at 2621–23.
84. See id. at 2621 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942)).
85. See id. at 2617–20. Justice Ginsburg demonstrated that the line between “activity” and
“inactivity” was not always as obvious as the majority supposed, especially in the context of
regulating interstate commerce. She properly focused on the failure to buy health insurance, but
other examples could be adduced, such as passively holding stocks or commodities instead of
marketing them based on the calculation that they will appreciate in value. Thus, in future cases, the
“activity vs. inactivity” distinction may prove difficult to maintain. See Metzger, supra note 17, at
93–95, 98–99.
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the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.”86 Congress rationally determined that the IM was crucial to carry
into effect its overall regulatory program of reforming health insurance,
because otherwise its goal of universal and affordable coverage would be
thwarted, and the statutory guarantee of obtaining insurance would reward
those who chose to wait until they had a major illness to buy a policy.87
In sum, Justice Ginsburg maintained that the IM was a valid exercise of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, considered either by itself or
in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause.
III. A CRITIQUE OF NATIONAL FEDERATION
The Court’s treatment of the Commerce Clause in this case can most
usefully be examined from two perspectives. First, we will discuss the
intractable jurisprudential problems that National Federation illuminates.
Second, we hope to demonstrate that these difficulties will likely ensure that
this decision has a very small long-range impact.
A. Problems with the Court’s Commerce Clause Analysis
National Federation illustrates the glaring flaws in the Court’s
Commerce Clause approach88 and confirms the thoughts that one of us
expressed shortly after the Raich decision, which commentators of all
political stripes had erroneously interpreted as signifying the demise of the
Court’s effort to craft and enforce genuine restrictions on Congress:
[I]t is impossible to determine whether the majority or the dissent
[in Raich] correctly applied the Lopez or Morrison standards,
because they are so malleable as to justify either result. Moreover,
as the Justices implement these standards prudentially on a case-bycase basis, it is unwise to extrapolate far-reaching implications from
any single decision. Just as many scholars prematurely heralded
Lopez as the beginning of a Commerce Clause revolution, others
86. See id. at 2625–26 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)); see also id. at
2626–27 (rejecting Chief Justice Roberts’s claim that the IM is not “proper” and dismissing as
untenable his distinction between “incidental” and “substantive” powers).
87. See id. at 2613–15, 2617, 2625–26. Thus, the IM did not compel the purchase of an
unwanted product, because everyone will need (and want) health care, and Congress merely
determined that they must pay for it in advance through insurance. Id. at 2617–20.
88. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Obamacare and the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause:
Identifying Historical Limits on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 1707–08, 1743–53
(detailing this argument).
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now may be too quick to characterize Raich as the end. Finally, the
Court’s discretionary application of protean standards guarantees
both accusations of political manipulation and continuous
uncertainty for Congress, lower court judges, and lawyers.89
The ACA starkly exposed such difficulties because it presented a novel
issue: Could Congress invoke the Commerce Clause to require citizens to
purchase goods or services?90 Even if the case law were cogent, it could not
answer that precise question, because the Court had never before considered
an individual mandate. Therefore, it was entirely predictable that the
Justices would apply that precedent differently in National Federation.
The majority stressed that both Congress and the Court had always
construed the Commerce Clause as allowing only the regulation of existing
commercial “activity,” not “inactivity.”91 This conclusion finds support in
the language repeated in every major Commerce Clause opinion that
Congress can regulate “activity” that substantially affects interstate
commerce.92 In those cases, however, the Court did not use the word
“activity” to draw a contrast with “inactivity,” for the simple reason that
none of the challenged statutes addressed the failure to act.93 Instead, the
Court (especially in Lopez and its progeny) was contrasting “commercial”
activity with “noncommercial” activity.94 Thus, it was not clear whether
Congress could reach “inactivity.”
Likewise, the applicability of Wickard and Raich was open to debate.
Justice Ginsburg echoed the judges and scholars who had argued that these
decisions were directly on point and required sustaining the ACA under the
Commerce Clause.95 The majority, however, distinguished those cases.96
For example, Wickard involved a man who was engaged in the business of
farming, even though the specific AAA provision invoked against him
89. See Pushaw, Medical Marijuana Case, supra note 9, at 884.
90. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
91. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–18, 20–26, 28–30, 32 (2005); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607–27 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–67 (1995);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–29 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 37 (1937).
93. See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1285–86 (N.D.
Fla. 2011).
94. See supra notes 50, 57, 60, 62 and accompanying text; see also Leslie Meltzer Henry &
Maxwell L. Stearns, Commerce Games and the Individual Mandate, 100 GEO. L.J. 1117, 1127–-29
(2012) (arguing that the Court in Lopez and later cases intended to limit Congress to regulating only
“commercial” or “economic” matters and did not express any opinion as to whether the regulatory
subject took an active or passive form).
95. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2616–21; see also Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d
529, 542–47 (6th Cir. 2011); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 29–40 (D.D.C. 2011); Liberty
Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 630–34 (W.D. Va. 2010); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce,
109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2010); Coenen, supra note 65, at 57, 71–72.
96. Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2590–93 (Roberts, C.J.).
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covered his non-commercial activity of growing wheat for personal
consumption.97 Raich pushed the ball further, because it allowed the
extension of federal drug laws to women who did not buy or sell marijuana,
but rather merely grew, possessed, and smoked it for personal medicinal
purposes.98 Obamacare required another, and bolder, leap: permitting the
federal government to get at people who have done absolutely nothing.99
Congress’s own legal researchers recognized that the IM thereby broke new
ground.100
The ACA’s novelty, however, is not dispositive. On the one hand, the
majority maintained that Congress’s failure to ever assert a particular power
(such as ordering people to buy a product to facilitate interstate commerce)
indicates that Congress lacks such power.101 On the other hand, that same
charge could be leveled at every major piece of Commerce Clause
legislation—labor and employment statutes, the Civil Rights Act,
environmental laws, and the like. All new laws are, by definition, novel.
Thus, the IM’s innovative nature does not necessarily make it
unconstitutional.102
In short, reasonable people can differ as to how Commerce Clause case
law should have been applied in National Federation. Nonetheless, Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion sets forth the more persuasive treatment of precedent.
The Court’s analysis in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich centered on whether
the federal regulatory scheme, considered as a whole, was “commercial” and

97. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113–28.
98. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 5–33.
99. Thus, cases such as Wickard and Raich did not involve congressional attempts to compel
individuals to buy products or services. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2587–88, 2590–93; Barnett,
Commandeering, supra note 16, at 605, 615–20.
100. They concluded:
While in Wickard and Raich, the individuals were participating in their own home
activities (i.e., producing wheat for home consumption and cultivating marijuana for
personal use), they were acting of their own volition, and this activity was determined to
be economic in nature and affected interstate commerce. However, [the mandate] could
be imposed on some individuals who engage in virtually no economic activity
whatsoever. This is a novel issue: whether Congress can use its Commerce Clause
authority to require a person to buy a good or service and whether this type of required
participation can be considered economic activity.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 6 (July 24, 2009).
101. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010)).
102. See Coenen, supra note 65, at 63–64 (contending that the Framers intended the Necessary
and Proper Clause to give Congress the flexibility to adopt creative means to best achieve future
legislative objectives that could not possibly be predicted).
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substantially affected the interstate economy.103 If not, Congress could not
legislate. If so, Congress could choose any means (even those that were
non-commercial or intrastate, or both) that it reasonably determined were
necessary to carry into effect its overall regulatory system. For instance, in
Morrison, the Court found that VAWA’s comprehensive scheme for
preventing gender-motivated violence did not concern “commerce” or
conduct that had interstate ramifications.104 Conversely, Raich held that the
general regulatory framework did address interstate commerce (the
marijuana trade) and therefore allowed Congress to select the means—
prohibiting even the non-commercial, intrastate possession and use of
marijuana—that it deemed necessary to implement that larger scheme.105
Likewise, the Court in Wickard deferred to Congress’s decision to ban the
non-commercial, local cultivation of wheat to effectuate its overall
regulatory program of reducing the national wheat supply to increase
prices.106
Applying the foregoing analysis to the ACA, Congress’s comprehensive
regulatory scheme plainly dealt with “commerce” (medical insurance) that
had a multibillion dollar interstate economic impact.107 Consequently, the
sole issue was whether Congress had reasonably concluded that the IM was
a necessary and appropriate means to implement that overall regulatory
framework. The Court has acceded to such discretionary legislative
judgments for two centuries.108 This history of judicial deference led even
two conservative Republican Circuit Court judges, Jeffrey Sutton and
Laurence Silberman, to uphold the ACA as a valid exercise of the

103. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–68 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 601–19 (2000); Raich, 545 U.S. at 5–33.
104. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613–19.
105. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18–27.
106. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124–29.
107. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10106, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2) (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 112-207) (congressional findings). No one in the litigation contested this fact.
108. The Rehnquist Court established that Congress could legislate only as to conduct that was
“commercial,” either of itself or as “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at 24; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18.
Nonetheless, if Congress was regulating interstate commerce, the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses authorized Congress to choose any means that were reasonably related to achieving a
legitimate legislative end—a very deferential standard of judicial review that originated in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–15 (1819).
Thus, in the Obamacare case, the four liberal Justices cited cases stretching from McCulloch
to the present to accuse the majority of refusing to respect Congress’s policy judgment that the IM
was a reasonable means of effectuating its valid objective of providing universal and affordable
health insurance. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2615–17, 2625–27
(2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part); see also Coenen, supra note 65, at
57, 69–66 (contending that the IM can be justified under a straightforward application of McCulloch,
which correctly captured the Founders’ understanding that the Necessary and Proper Clause gave
Congress broad power to enact “all Laws” that it deemed beneficial to implement its Commerce
Clause legislation).
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Commerce Power.109 Their opinions disturbingly suggest that lower federal
courts respect Supreme Court precedent more than the Justices themselves—
or perhaps that the case law is so malleable that it can be molded to justify
any result.
To recap, in National Federation a bare majority ruled that the
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate only existing
commercial activity, even when inactivity (such as failing to buy health
insurance) “substantially affected” interstate commerce.110 Although this
decision reasonably applied the relevant case law, that precedent is so vague
that the dissenters’ opposite conclusion was at least equally plausible.111 It is
also worth noting that the Court reaffirmed the Lopez holding that Congress
could reach only “commercial” activity.112
B. The Probable Impact of National Federation
The four liberal Justices and their scholarly supporters expressed alarm
that the Court had sharply broken from its precedent by overturning
Congress’s policy judgments about a critical national economic and social
issue, thereby paving the way for similar challenges to other federal
statutes.113 Meanwhile, some conservative commentators have asserted that
Chief Justice Roberts adroitly gave liberal Democrats a temporary win but
furthered long-range conservative Republican aims by placing a big
restriction on Congress: prohibiting it from imposing requirements on people
who were not currently engaged in commercial “activity.”114
Such predictions that National Federation will spark major changes
ignore the pitfalls of trying to discern broad future trends based upon a
single case, especially one that split the Court so badly.115 Indeed, the
durability of National Federation’s Commerce Clause holding, as well as
the Lopez/Morrison stricture against regulating “noncommercial” activity,
depends on whether the five Republican Justices continue serving (or are

109. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 554-66 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton. J.,
concurring); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 14–20 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
110. See supra Part II.A.
111. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2609–25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
112. See id. at 2586–90 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643–44, 2648–49 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
113. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
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replaced by like-minded jurists).116 The four liberals have never accepted
Lopez and are likewise adamantly opposed to National Federation’s
“activity” limit on the Commerce Power.117 Therefore, if a liberal
Democratic appointee replaces a Republican one (a certainty if a vacancy
arises in the next three years), all of these decisions will undoubtedly be
reversed or severely circumscribed. If the razor-thin Republican majority
remains intact, however, National Federation may well lead to further
cutbacks, for two reasons.
First, the Court applied its new Commerce Clause “activity” limitation
to legislation that was of monumental importance, unlike the inconsequential
statutes struck down in Lopez and Morrison.118 Thus, National Federation is
truly pathbreaking because it is the only case since 1936 in which the Court
has found that a non-trivial law fell outside the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Power.119
Second, Chief Justice Roberts and his Republican colleagues asserted
that, even if Congress had determined that a particular means (such as the
IM) was “necessary” to carry into effect its overall legislative scheme, such
a means was not “proper” if it undercut the Constitution’s federalist
structure.120 We applaud this decision because we have long urged the
Court, consistent with the Constitution’s original meaning, to prevent
Congress from relying upon the Necessary and Proper Clause as a bootstrap
to aggrandize power it does not possess under the Commerce Clause.121
Nonetheless, the Court for well over a century has interpreted the Necessary
and Proper Clause as conferring plenary authority on Congress to select the
means best suited to accomplish its legislative objectives.122 Hence,
National Federation was unprecedented insofar as a majority of Justices
claimed that they could substitute their prudential judgments for Congress’s
about the propriety of a statute based on their contestable notions of
federalism.123 Because the “substantial effects” test rests heavily upon the
116. See supra notes 63, 89 and accompanying text.
117. Justice Ginsburg joined each of the three Lopez dissenting opinions. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602-03 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603-15 (Souter, J., dissenting);
id. at 615-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). These four Justices reaffirmed their position in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See id. at 628-55 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 655-64 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). They then persuaded Justices Scalia and Kennedy to join them in upholding Congress’s
Commerce Clause power to make it a crime to grow, posses, and use marijuana in Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5-33 (2005). Justices Stevens and Souter have been replaced by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan, who joined Justice Ginsburg’s opinion endorsing unfettered power to
regulate interstate commerce in National Federation. See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying
text. It is wishful thinking to imagine that they will change their minds.
118. See supra notes 48–58 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 20, 37 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
121. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 35, at 29, 56–57, 83, 98–100.
122. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 74–76, 86–87, 102–12 and accompanying text; see also Coenen, supra note
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Necessary and Proper Clause,124 this newly muscular approach to judicial
review suddenly makes many federal laws vulnerable to attack.
In short, National Federation may signal that the five conservative
Republican Justices are prepared to dramatically scale back Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce. Nonetheless, we doubt that such
revolutionary changes will occur, for both historical and practical reasons.
Our skepticism reflects the Court’s near-perfect track record over
seventy-five years of upholding Acts of Congress passed pursuant Article I,
typically the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.125 The only
Justice who has questioned such precedent is Clarence Thomas, and even he
has acknowledged that its reversal is a pipe dream because of stare decisis
and attendant reliance interests.126 Put bluntly, it is too late for the Court to
overturn its cases rubber-stamping all New Deal and Great Society
legislation–or even its decisions in the 1970s and 1980s approving
comprehensive environmental and criminal laws.127 Consequently, the
conservative Justices’ only feasible strategy is to try to thwart new
Commerce Clause statutes.128 But even that unambitious agenda may not
succeed, as the Court’s only post-1936 attempt to rein in Congress–
confining it to the regulation of interstate “commercial” matters in Lopez and
Morrison–collapsed within a decade.129 Similarly, National Federation’s
“activity” limit will probably have little lasting influence, for four reasons.
First, the ACA is the only Commerce Clause statute in over two
centuries that purported to regulate “inactivity” by mandating the purchase
of a product.130 Congress may never employ this device again, which would
make National Federation a one-shot curiosity.
Second, even if Congress were to enact such a law, it would be struck
down only if five conservative Republican Justices happened to be on the
Court, and they were willing to adhere to National Federation. Neither of
these scenarios may come to pass. Indeed, National Federation (like Raich)
illustrates the unwillingness of all five Justices to simultaneously “cross the
65, at 59-70 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause has always been understood as (1)
granting Congress plenary power to enact “all Laws” that it determines are most beneficial in
effectuating its exercise of other constitutional powers, and (2) not imposing nebulous limits on
Congress to promote the Justices’ vision of “federalism” and “liberty”).
124. See supra notes 8–9, 12, 17, 39–46, 74–76, 86–87, 102–12 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 8–9, 21–22, 26, 39–46 and accompanying text.
126. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
127. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 16, 22–23 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 48–63 and accompanying text.
130. See Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S. Ct. at 2586–87 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 2644–46 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting); Metzger, supra note 17, at 98–99.
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Rubicon” and invalidate a crucial federal statute.
Third, and relatedly, Chief Justice Roberts ultimately concluded that
Congress could regulate “inactivity,” albeit under the Taxing Power rather
than the Commerce Clause.131 Roberts’s odd embrace of virtually plenary
taxing authority rendered largely nugatory the restrictions that he and the
four conservatives had placed on the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses.132
Fourth, looking beyond the specific “inactivity” issue, I would be
shocked if the Court started to frequently second-guess Congress’s
determinations about whether a law is “necessary and proper” to carry into
effect its legislative program. Rather, the Court will likely revert to its
traditional practice of deferring to such congressional judgments because
they tend to be subjective and policy-laden.133
Overall, National Federation will probably not appreciably alter the
Court’s cautious approach of retaining its basic Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and making incremental changes at the margins.134 Even the
five conservative Republican Justices seem unwilling to deal with the
negative (and possibly catastrophic) political and practical ramifications that
would flow from radical doctrinal changes.
IV. LIMITING CONGRESS TO THE REGULATION OF VOLUNTARY, MARKETORIENTED ACTIVITY
The politicization of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence is hardly
a recent phenomenon. For example, pressure from New Deal Democrats
induced the Court to make up the “substantially affects” and “aggregate”
tests.135 Likewise, ideological sympathy to Great Society legislation
(especially the Civil Rights Act) explains why the Warren Court gave
Congress free rein by adding the toothless “rational basis” standard of

131. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 11–15, 26 and accompanying text. We should clarify that the Chief Justice
did not say that the power to tax was absolute. Rather, he would not allow Congress to levy a
purported “tax” that (unlike the IM) was so high as to be in reality a “penalty.” Nat’l Fed’n, 132 S.
Ct. at 2595–96. This proposed limit, however, should have been irrelevant because the IM did not
involve a “tax” at all, so there was no reason to consider its magnitude. Rather, the IM was a
“penalty” for violation of the Commerce Clause regulation mandating the purchase of insurance.
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. Chief Justice Roberts simply rewrote the ACA by
changing the IM into a “tax” for the sole purpose of enabling him to uphold it under the Taxing
Clause. Roberts’s decision to do so reduced to empty rhetoric his statements elsewhere in his
opinion that the Constitution limits the federal government to its enumerated powers and leaves all
other powers to the states or the People collectively. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text
133. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
134. See Metzger, supra note 17, at 87, 113 (similarly predicting that the case will have a modest
impact).
135. See supra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.
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review.136 And, from the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Court’s
recent doctrinal innovations—prohibiting Congress from regulating
“noncommercial” matters (Lopez) and “inactivity” (National Federation)—
advance the aims of conservative Republicans, who have advocated
restrictions on the federal government and reinvigorated state autonomy.137
Further case-by-case adjustments to the present Commerce Clause
standards would merely prolong this partisan wrangling. Accordingly, the
Court should adopt a fresh approach based on legal principles, which can be
derived by applying the two-step Neo-Federalist methodology that we have
previously set forth.138 First, we recaptured the Commerce Clause’s original
“meaning” (the ordinary definition of its words in 1787), “intent” (its
Framers’ objectives), and “understanding” (the sense of its Ratifiers).139
Second, we examined those Federalist precepts in light of over two centuries
of legislative and judicial construction to develop legal rules that could be
employed today in a practical way (i.e., without dismantling the modern
federal administrative and social welfare state).140
This investigation yielded clear legal rules that can be applied
consistently and in an apolitical manner. At the threshold, Congress can
only regulate “commerce,” defined as “the voluntary sale or exchange of
property and all accompanying market-based activities, enterprises,
relationships, and interests.”141 If a statute meets this requirement, the
commerce must be “among the several States”—that is, it must either cross a
state line or occur within one state but affect others.142 Such an interstate
impact is almost inevitable in America’s interdependent national economy.
Application of our framework would result in sustaining most
Commerce Clause legislation, such as that concerning (1) the sale of goods
and their production through manufacturing, mining, farming, fishing, and
forestry—including environmental, safety, and health byproducts of those
136. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 47–58, 65–76 and accompanying text.
138. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 35, at 8–13, 107. For general descriptions of the NeoFederalist approach, see, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1541–42 (2007); Robert J. Pusahw, Jr., Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
447, 448–49, 456–68 (1994). This methodology can usefully be applied to all constitutional
provisions, with the possible exception of those involving war powers. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial
Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1017–18 n.38 (2007).
139. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 35, at 8–9.
140. See id. at 9.
141. Id.; see also id. at 107–10 (fleshing out this definition).
142. Id. at 10–11, 110–11.
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activities; (2) business services such as banking, insurance, paid
transportation, and public accommodations—as well as antitrust and
antidiscrimination laws that facilitate a free market in such services; (3)
crimes that entail the voluntary sale of goods (such as illegal drugs) and
services (gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, and the like); and (4) the
protection of specific commercial transactions and entities (such as banks
and abortion clinics) against criminal or tortious misconduct.143
Our market-oriented approach, while broad, did recognize certain
boundaries. Most pertinently, “commerce” extends only to voluntary—not
compelled—market transactions.144 Furthermore, this word cannot plausibly
be stretched to cover actions taken merely to fulfill personal or household
needs, such as growing wheat or marijuana for home consumption (contrary
to the holdings in Wickard and Raich). Finally, the Commerce Clause, read
in light of the Constitution’s structure of limited federal government
authority and reserved state powers, prohibits Congress from reaching its
tentacles into matters of wholly moral, social, or cultural concern (like
violent crime).145
The foregoing Commerce Clause analysis would have resulted in
upholding all of the ACA provisions except for the individual mandate.
Initially, Congress can regulate the general subjects of health care and
insurance because they concern the sale of products and services in the
marketplace. In fact, we have consistently argued that Congress can address
the specific business of insurance, which for hundreds of years has been
deemed a major “branch of commerce.”146 Moreover, the markets for health
care and insurance obviously have interstate impacts. Nevertheless,
Congress cannot compel Americans to purchase insurance because such
transactions would not be voluntary sales of property or services in the
market. Thus, the IM is not a regulation of “commerce” within the meaning
of the Commerce Clause.147 As such, there is no need to go further and
evaluate the IM’s interstate effects.

143. Id. at 9–12, 107–13, 119–27, 136–52, 158–63 (citing numerous examples).
144. Id. at 9, 107.
145. Id. at 10–12, 21, 27, 41, 78, 109–10.
146. Id. at 10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 85, 108.
147. The IM clearly is not “voluntary” because it expressly forces Americans to buy something
against their will. A harder case would arise if Congress sought to achieve the same result
indirectly, such as through a prohibition that had the practical effect of compelling people to make
particular purchases. We would not, however, permit such clever subterfuges. We admit that the
distinction between “voluntary” and “involuntary” transactions might sometimes be hard to draw,
but that difficulty does not justify giving Congress carte blanche to impose commercial mandates.
See Pushaw, supra note 88, at 1752 n.302.
Furthermore, we acknowledge that Congress might be able to require certain actions pursuant
to other Article I clauses. For instance, Congress might exercise its power to tax and spend for the
“general welfare” by providing funds for mandatory vaccinations to halt the national spread of a
virulent disease.
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For over two centuries, Congress implicitly understood this
“voluntariness” dimension because it never ordered people to make
purchases and then asserted that its own mandate was commerce that exerted
substantial interstate effects.
Discarding the volitional aspect of
“commerce” would make Congress’s power absolute, as it could then force
everyone against their will into any market—be it for domestic automobiles,
avocados, accountant services, or tattoo parlors—on the ground that
consumers’ countless non-decisions are actually “commercial” activities that
have a “substantial effect” on the interstate economy.148
In sum, the Nelson/Pushaw approach would have led to the same result
as that reached by Chief Justice Roberts and his Republican cohorts, but
through a straightforward application of clear legal rules rooted in the
Commerce Clause. Because we set forth our analysis long before
Obamacare was enacted, we cannot be accused of inventing a new test (such
as the “activity vs. inactivity” distinction) to justify a preferred political
outcome. The Court would be wise to “tie itself to the mast” in a similar
manner by pre-committing itself to abide by fixed legal rules. Sadly, it is
unlikely to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
We would be surprised if National Federation presages the
transformation of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, mainly because all of the
Justices (except Thomas) have accepted the established analytical
framework: Congress merely needs a rational basis for determining that the
activity regulated, considered in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate

148. The principal objection to my suggested approach is that striking down the IM would have
undermined the ACA’s overall regulatory scheme. See supra notes 86–87, 103–47 and
accompanying text. That is correct, but a similar argument could be made about any attempt to
impose meaningful legal restraints under the Commerce Clause. For instance, the Nelson/Pushaw
proposal would necessitate the invalidation of federal statutory provisions prohibiting the mere
possession (as contrasted with sale) of items such as wheat, guns, or marijuana.
We admit that such exceptions keep Congress from legislating about everything in any way it
pleases. Such restraints, however, must be identified and enforced to maintain a written Constitution
that enumerates and limits the federal government’s powers. Thus, if Congress wants to address
medical insurance, it must do so consistently with the Commerce Clause. If that Clause (alone, or
in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause) grants Congress complete freedom to select
any means to implement its larger regulation of health insurance, then Congress can require not only
the purchase of an insurance policy but also food items, gym memberships, and innumerable other
things. Such untrammeled federal power is not “proper,” as it would eliminate all limits on the
federal government (and the individual liberty that those constraints aim to protect). See Pushaw,
supra note 88, at 1753 (summarizing the foregoing argument).
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commerce.149 Over the past seventeen years, five conservative Republican
Justices have announced that this deferential standard of review does have
two outer limits.150 First, Lopez held that Congress can legislate only as to
activity that is “commercial,” either of itself or as part of a larger economic
regulatory scheme.151 Second, National Federation ruled that the Commerce
Clause did not extend to commercial “inactivity.”152 Even those two modest
restrictions prompted acrimonious dissents by four liberal Justices, who are
firmly committed to granting Congress plenary power to regulate anything
that might affect the national economy.153
Furthermore, the conservative Justices’ bark is much worse than their
bite. Most notably, they have collectively shown no inclination to overturn
any Commerce Clause cases decided between 1937 and 1994.154 Moreover,
as a group they cannot maintain the unity necessary to consolidate even their
small recent gains. For example, in Raich, Justices Kennedy and Scalia
would not follow the logic of Lopez and Morrison because doing so would
have resulted in the invalidation of a significant statute.155 Similarly, in
National Federation, the five Republicans agreed that the ACA had
exceeded the bounds of the Commerce Clause, but Chief Justice Roberts
could not bring himself to strike down a law as important as Obamacare.156
Of course, the turncoat Justices rationalized their decisions through
clever interpretations of the relevant precedent, which sets forth flexible
standards that can easily be manipulated on a case-by-case basis to achieve
The Court obviously prefers this
political or ideological goals.157
discretionary common law approach to one based upon clear legal rules,
such as Justice Thomas’s proposed limitation of Commerce Clause
regulation to trade and transportation158 or the Nelson/Pushaw “market”
thesis.159
In short, National Federation does not strike me us a harbinger of a
revolution in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Rather, the Court’s “activity
vs. inactivity” distinction will likely prove to be a minor skirmish in a war to
restrain Congress that was lost long ago.

149. See supra notes 6–9, 125–27 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 47–58 and accompanying text.
151. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), discussed supra notes 47–54 and
accompanying text.
152. See Nat’l Fed’n of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
153. See supra notes 26, 49, 77–87, 108, 117 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 21–22, 39–45, 49, 62, 125–29 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 11–17, 64–76, 114, 131–32 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 51–63 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.

1000

